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Privacy in Public Spaces: What Expectations of Privacy do we have in Social 
Media Intelligence? 
 
Lilian Edwards and Lachlan Urquhart1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Since Edward Snowden’s revelations burst upon the world in 20132, the general popu-
lation has become sensitised to the fact that our private communications – whether 
made by phone, text, email or social network – may quite likely be under covert sur-
veillance by law enforcement and intelligence agencies such as the US’s NSA, the UK’s 
GCHQ, et al. This is not yet another article about the Snowden revelations and the 
legality or otherwise of covert state surveillance of private electronic communications. 
Instead it discusses a connected and worrying area which has received relatively little 
public attention or legal analysis. Herein we look at the growing use by law enforce-
ment agencies (LEAs) of publicly available social media communications (or social 
media “intelligence”, known as SOCMINT) for investigating, prosecuting and perhaps 
most significantly, attempting to predict and prevent crime and social unrest3.  
 
SOCMINT embraces a vast amount of material including posts made public on Face-
book, tweets sent into the world, videos hosted on YouTube, comments on online  pub-
lic newspaper or TV news sites. Much of this material will qualify as “personal data” 
within the framework of the EU Data Protection Directive4 and will contribute to “pri-
vate life” in terms of art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)5. 
Much of it may also be “sensitive” in the terminology of the DPD as referring to inti-
mate matters such as a person’s sexuality, race, colour or health status6. The volume 
and significance of this material disclosed to the world in today;s digital world is almost 
incomprehensible. According to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parlia-
ment’s 2015 report7: 
 
                                                
1 Professor of Internet Law, Centre for Internet Law and Policy, University of Strathclyde: lilian.ed-
wards@strath.ac.uk and Doctoral Researcher, Mixed Reality Lab and Horizon Centre for Doctoral 
Training,  University of Nottingham: lachlan.urquhart@nottingham.ac.uk . All links unless otherwise 
noted were checked as of 20 November 2015. 
2 This is not the place for a bibliography of the Snowden/PRISM revelations or their international polit-
ical, legal and technical fallout. A good starting point for UK legal ramifications might be the pleadings 
of Privacy International (PI) in its suit against the UK at the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) for 
breaches of RIPA: the claim was disallowed: see [2014] UKIPTrib 13_77-H. 
3 Including, possibly, non-criminal social unrest (see for example, the UK controversy around criminal-
ising “extremist” ideas : see BBC News report “Cameron unveils strategy to tackle Islamist extrem-
ism”, 20 July 2015.) 
4 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protec-
tion of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, OJ L 281/31, 23.11.95 (hereafter “DPD”) transposed into the UK Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA 
1998).  
5 Rome, 4.XI.195 as amended. 
6 See DPD art 8. 
7 Intelligence and Security Committee, Privacy and security: a modern and transparent legal frame-
work, HC 1075 2014/15, 12 March 2015 (hereafter the “ISC report”) para 55, drawing on “What hap-
pens in an internet minute?” Intel Corporation, 5 December 2014. 
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“The internet carries the communications of 2.4 billion internet users. In one mi-
nute, those 2.4 billion transfer 1,572,877 gigabytes of data, including 204 million 
emails, 4.1 million Google searches, 6.9 million messages sent via Facebook, 
347,222 posts to Twitter and 138,889 hours of video watched on YouTube.” 
 
The net effect of this deluge of material on to the world’s screens is that where once 
LEAs had to spend enormous amounts of resources, time and effort in acquiring details 
of the lives of those under suspicion, actually or potentially, by secret or covert intelli-
gence gathering, much simpler, cheaper and easier technological means now exist to 
monitor much of what we all say, do, think and feel - simply by listening to what we 
say “publicly” on Facebook, Twitter et al. 
 
SOCMINT, though dabbled with earlier, was first used in anger as a valuable tool for  
UK policing during the London riots of 20118, which simultaneously highlighted both 
the enormous potential value of digital communications in controlling crime and dis-
turbance, and the UK police’s ill-preparedness for such analysis. Since 2011, LEAs 
have worked to expand and improve their use of digital communications – including 
calls, texts, social media posts, instant messaging and tweets - as intelligence.  These 
intelligence-led practices are now routinely assisted by “big data” predictive analytics 
software, allowing law enforcement agencies to anticipate, rather than merely react to, 
crime and antisocial behaviour9. According to the RUSI report of 2015, the	majority	of	 intelligence	–	up	 to	95%	–	gathered	by	 intelligence	agencies	originates	 from	open,	not	closed,	sources,	unsurprising	given	its	cheapness	to	collect	and	accessi-bility	compared	to	“secret”	intelligence10.	While	not	all	this	“open	source”	intelli-gence	(known	as	OSINT	–	see	discussion	below)	derives	from	social	media,	much	does:	 in	October	2014,	 James	Clapper,	 the	Director	of	National	 Intelligence,	de-scribed	social	media	as	“huge	for	intelligence	purposes”11	and	the	extensively	re-searched	 Anderson	 Report	 makes	 plain	 the	 increasing	 central	 reliance	 on	SOCMINT12. 
 
                                                
8 See for a general overview and analysis of the London riots, see P Lewis et al  Reading the Riots: In-
vestigating England’s Summer of Disorder (London School of Economics and The Guardian, London 
2012) and discussion below. 
9For critique of applying “big data” profiling to social media data , especially tweets, see C Miller , S 
Ginnis et al The road to representivity  (Demos/IPSOS Mori, September 2015) at http://www.de-
mos.co.uk/project/the-road-to-representivity/ . 
10 RUSI A Democratic Licence to Operate: Report of the Independent Surveillance Review Panel of the 
Independent Surveillance Review, Whitehall Reports, 13 July 2015 at https://rusi.org/publica-
tion/whitehall-reports/democratic-licence-operate-report-independent-surveillance-review  (hereafter, 
the “RUSI report”), para 3.16. 
11  A Question of Trust – Report of the Investigatory Powers Review , June 11 2015 ( at https://terror-
ismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/a-question-of-trust-report-of-the-investigatory-powers-re-
view/  )(hereafter, the “Anderson report”), para 4.27. 
12 “A former head of the bin Laden Unit of the Central Intelligence Agency in the United States noted 
that ‘90% of what you need to know’ comes from OSINT. According to a report in 2010, ‘in the after-
math of 9/11, intelligence failures - particularly a deficient consideration of OSINT … - have been 
identified as major reasons for the inability to anticipate and prevent these attacks.’” Anderson report, 
ibid. See also Anderson report, para 4.29: “the extent of that use [of OSINT] is not publicly known.” 
(citing C Hobbs et al (eds), Open Source Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century: New Approaches 
and Opportunities, (2014), p 24. 
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As discussed below, the assumption commonly made is that “open” SOCMINT  - 
herein defined as social media communications accessible to the world to the world 
without the protection of “Friends-locks”, passwords or encryption -  are “fair game” 
for surveillance, devoid of any expectation of privacy protection.  Hence the lack, in 
the main, of a legal debate around the acquisition of SOCMINT without the consent 
and usually, knowledge, of the sender .  
 
However, given the vast amount of personal and often intimate information disclosed 
to the world via social media - and the increasing use of this material to profile and 
target citizens for special attention or suspicion by LEAs and intelligence organisations 
– it is necessary to ask if this assumption is now (or ever was) true. Is the collection and 
processing of SOCMINT without consent or knowledge ever a breach of individual 
privacy? Or, to put it another way, do we have any reasonable expectation of privacy 
in personal information even though publicly disseminated? If so, then laws must de-
termine if the public interest in policing proportionately outweighs the privacy interest 
of those monitored; and a  consensus must be reached on what type of authorisation, if 
any, is needed to gather such information and what redress for misuse is available to 
the public.13.  
 
Covert interception of private emails, texts and phone calls by LEAs has been con-
trolled by explicit, if baroquely complex14, laws since the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) and, to some extent, before that, in the Interception of Com-
munications Act 1985.  RIPA is the obvious first place to look, if rather in vain, for 
control of acquisition of SOCMINT (see further below p xx). The Conservative gov-
ernment elected in summer 2015 promised in its first Queens Speech a reconsideration 
and recasting of both RIPA and DRIPA (the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers 
Act 2014) and this reformulation is under current debate in the Investigatory Powers 
Bill 201515 (see further below).  The new Bill seems unlikely however to do much to 
clarify the legal issues posed by police acquisition and use of SOCMINT (and OSINT 
in general) which remain vague and underexplored, even after (or perhaps because of) 
the ongoing period of legal turmoil in online privacy since the Snowden revelations16.  
                                                
13 Social media communications are also acquired by non-policing authorities eg marketing and re-
search companies. Twitter, eg, makes a substantial part of its revenue by selling access to the “Twitter 
firehose” (see description at https://www.echosec.net/twitter-api-vs-firehose/ . In this article we are 
concerned only with policing use, given the impact on personal liberty of police power and attention: 
however the private aspect of this issue should not be ignored, especially given the private/public na-
ture of much data profiling (see section 2 below). 
14 The ISC report described it as “"absurdly complicated" and the Anderson report as “obscure since its 
inception …has been patched up so many times as to make it incomprehensible to all but a tiny band of 
initiates” (para 35).  
15 Introduced as a draft Bill on 4 November 2015 at https://www.gov.uk/government/publica-
tions/draft-investigatory-powers-bill . Many related documents are available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/draft-investigatory-powers-bill . 
16 Again, it is not the place of this article to explore the full impact of the Snowden revelations on the 
UK’s and EU’s data privacy and data retention laws. However, in brief, in 2014, the European Court of 
Justice ruled that the long controversial EC Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC was unconstitutional 
due to its endorsement of Europe-wide blanket surveillance without proper controls over (inter alia) 
how relevant data retained was to particular, serious crimes, and minimum safeguards for access to 
data retained (Digital Rights Ireland Ltd (C-293/12) v Minister for Communications, Joined Cases C-
293/12 and C-594/12). The UK’s response to this judgement was to pass emergency legislation, the 
Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (DRIPA), to ensure continued retention of data by 
communications service providers. In July 2015, this Act was itself declared invalid as in breach of EU 
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Below, we therefore  
(i) Give a basic introduction to the transition in contemporary surveillance 
from top down traditional police surveillance to profiling and “pre-crime” 
methods; 
(ii) Review in more detail the rise of open source (OSINT) and social media 
(SOCMINT) intelligence and its use by law enforcement and security au-
thorities; 
(iii) Consider what if any privacy  protection is currently given in UK law to  
SOCMINT; 
(iv) Given the largely negative response to the above question, we analyse what 
reasonable expectations of privacy there may be for users of public social 
media, with reference to existing case law on art 8 of the ECHR. Two factors 
are in particular argued to be supportive of  a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in open public social media communications : first, the failure of many 
social network users to perceive the environment where they communicate 
as “public”; and secondly, the impact of search engines (and other auto-
mated analytics) on traditional conceptions of structured dossiers as  most 
problematic for state surveillance 
(v) Conclude that existing law does not provide adequate protection for open 
SOCMINT and that this will be increasingly significant as more and more 
personal data is disclosed and collected in public without well-defined ex-
pectations of privacy.  
 
2. Contemporary surveillance: from the panoptic Big Brother to public/private 
profiling 
 
Surveillance has become the guiding organisational principle for social control, partic-
ularly by managing populations through collection, sorting, management and risk as-
sessment of data (so called ‘dataveillance’).17 Tellingly, a UK Select Committee on 
Home Affairs report stated, as far back as 2008, "the foundation for all new surveillance 
technologies is the database”.18 Such data collection practices have become extensive, 
normalised and routine19, conducted by both state and non-state entities.20  Critically, 
                                                
law in an action brought by Liberty alongside MPs David Davis and Tom Watson (Davis and others v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWHC 2092 (Admin). An appeal is likely to fol-
low. Several of the major reports quoted herein which were delivered in summer 2015 (Anderson re-
port, n 11; RUSI report, n 10; ISC report, n 7) arose from the combination of the Snowden revelations 
and the cracks exposed in UK legal control over state surveillance after public awareness of mass sur-
veillance was raised. A number of other important CJEU privacy decisions raised below including the 
Google Spain and Schrems cases ( both n 150  infra ) are also clearly affected by the fallout from 
Snowden. 
17R Clarke, “Information Technology and Dataveillance” in C Dunlop and R Kling (eds), Computeriza-
tion and Controversy: Value Conflicts and Social Choices (Academic Press, Inc. Waltham 1991). 
18 Home Affairs Select Committee, A Surveillance Society? , Fifth Report of Session 2007-2008 (HC 
2008-2009 58-I).  
19GT Marx, “What’s New about the ‘New Surveillance’? Classifying for Change and Continuity” 
(2002) 1 Surveillance and Society 9. 
20W Webster et al  Deliverable 2.1 – The Social Perspective: A Report Presenting a Review of the Key 
Features Raised by the Social Perspectives of Surveillance and Democracy’ (Increasing Resilience in 
Surveillance Societies, 2013). 
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contemporary surveillance is understood21 to have moved beyond the simplistic, tradi-
tional notions of a top-down ‘Big Brother’ or Panoptic state, exercising centralised, 
institutionalised, disciplinary power.22 Instead, in ‘societies of control’23 information is 
gathered to surveille individuals not just via public powers of information gathering , 
but from a multitude of private actors – including off- and on-line retailers, employers, 
insurers, tax authorities, health providers and most notably “information intermediar-
ies” such as social networks, search engines, ISPs, and fixed line and mobile telecom-
munications operators. Individuals are surveilled, for commercial and entertainments 
well as security and governance purposes24, categorised and ‘socially sorted’, with the 
state no longer acting as the primary collator of data.25  Cumulatively these factors can 
be understood as representing a ‘surveillant assemblage’ where actors develop strate-
gies of governance and control, often via ‘centres of calculation’ such as police stations, 
forensic labs and statistical institutions.26 As Trottier notes, social media policing is 
thus part of this model of contemporary surveillance, incorporating a range of citizens, 
devices and personal software into an ‘assemblage’ that increases the visibility of eve-
ryday life.27 
 
Surveillance processes in an “assemblage” world are increasingly hard for individuals 
to perceive, challenge and resist. As Murakami Wood et al assert, a “surveillance sys-
tem is infrastructural, and when its workings are shrouded in technical mystique, it is 
very hard indeed to make a significant difference…individuals are seriously at a dis-
advantage in controlling the effects of surveillance”.28 Similarly, a 2009 House of 
Lords Select Committee Report noted that, “surveillance practices are often surrepti-
tious, non-transparent, and unaccountable. The aims, motives and procedures of those 
who collect and use personal information are often unclear, and therefore difficult to 
regulate, even when they fall within the scope of the law”.29 
 
Despite the decentralised, public/private nature of modern online surveillance, the state 
still plays a vital role in coordinating and consuming surveillance practices. In the 
PRISM operations, much of the data was collected by Google, Facebook et al but only 
when made available to state intelligence agencies (possibly not always with the coop-
eration or knowledge of  the data hosts) could deeply coercive sanctions such as im-
prisonment or interrogation be a consequence. Trottier again states, in the context of 
                                                
21K Haggerty “Tearing Down the Walls: On Demolishing the Panopticon” in D Lyon, Theorizing Sur-
veillance: The Panopticon and Beyond (Willan, Cullompton 2006); R Jones “Digital Rule: Punishment, 
Control and Technology” (2000) 2 Punishment and Society 5; R Boyne, “Post Panopticism” (2000) 29 
Economy and Society 285 ; W Bogard, “Welcome to the Society of Control” in KD Haggerty and 
RV Ericson eds, The New Politics of Surveillance Visibility (University o f  Toronto Press, 2006) 
22 M Foucault  Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Penguin Books,  1979). 
23 G  Deleuze, “Postscripts on the Societies of Control” (1992) 59 October Winter Ed 3. 
24 K Haggerty and R Ericson “Surveillant Assemblage’ (2001) 51 British Journal of Sociology 605. 
25 D Lyon Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy, Risk and Digital Discrimination, (Routledge, 2003) 
13. 
26 Haggerty and Ericson supra n 24 at 613;  B Latour Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and 
Engineers through Society (Harvard University Press, 2001) 
27 D Trottier Social Media as Surveillance: Rethinking Visibility in a Converging World (Ashgate Pub-
lishing, 2012). 
28 D Murakami Wood et al, A Report on the Surveillance Society, ( Surveillance Studies Network, 
UK Information Commissioner Office 2006). 
29 Select Committee on the Constitution, Surveillance: Citizens and the State Vol I: Report (HL, 2008- 
2009, 18-I) 
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social media, “surveillance implies an overview. This refers to the vantage point of the 
guard tower, but also the overview provided by digital technologies. Domesticated 
technologies augment this vantage point. Whereas the guard tower and even the CCTV 
are a top-down attempt to envision social life, social media are an – often unwilling – 
collaboration between top-down and bottom-up efforts”.30  
 
Having outlined the shifting nature of contemporary surveillance, we now outline how 
policing has changed, and the rise of social media datamining within this. 
 
 
3. Intelligence lead policing, SOCMINT and OSINT 
 
Open source (“OSINT”) and social media (“SOCMINT”) intelligence are new catego-
ries 31  of intelligence used by police that have joined already familiar intelligence 
sources such as SIGINT (signals intelligence), interception of communications from 
electronic sources ( ELINT, or between people, COMINT); and HUMINT (human in-
telligence sources). To understand the significance of the rise of SOCMINT and 
OSINT, we first need to discuss the emergence of general “intelligence led policing” in 
the UK. 
 
Tilley defines intelligence led policing as a way of doing practical police business by 
“more smartly, incorporating modern information technology and modern methods”.32  
This involves “developing and maintaining a detailed and up-to date picture of patterns 
of crime and criminality in order to intervene most effectively to disrupt networks and 
remove prolific offenders”.33 Newburn, Willliamson and Wright highlight that the shift 
from reactive to proactive intelligence-led investigations means “although police offic-
ers are still certainly involved, there are now many non-police actors – from civilian 
surveillance operatives to highly skilled analysts, without whom the system could not 
work”.34  
 
The growth of ‘managerialism’ in UK policing has been a key driver of intelligence led 
policing.35 Managerialism incorporates a strategic planning approach guided by moni-
toring of statistical data and a reliance on inter-agency cooperation; a focus on ‘stand-
ards of service’ as a means of measuring efficient uses of resources; and a reliance on 
‘actuarialism’.36 Actuarialism promotes risk based approaches to managing crime, as 
opposed to merely preventing or stopping it, and considers the population in terms of 
                                                
30 See D Trottier, supra n 27.  
31 D Omand, J Bartlett, and C Miller, “Introducing Social Media Intelligence” (2012) 27 Intelligence 
and National Security Review 1. 
32 N Tilley “Modern Approaches to Policing: Community, Problem Orientated and Intelligence Led” in 
T Newburn Handbook of Policing (Willan Publishing, 2008) p 373 at 383. 
33 Ibid at 384. 
34  T Newburn, T Williamson and A Wright  Handbook of Criminal Investigation (2nd edn, Willan Pub-
lishing,  2008) at p 653. 
35 T Jones and T Newburn, “The Transformation of Policing: Understanding  Current  Trends  in Polic-
ing Systems” (2002) 42 British Journal of Criminology 129 at 136; J  Ratcliffe, Intelligence Led Polic-
ing (Willan Publishing, 2008). 
36A F Bottoms, “The Philosophy and Politics of Punishment and Sentencing” in C. Clarkson, and R. 
Morgan, eds The Politics of Sentencing Reform (Clarendon Press, 1995) at p 25. 
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their statistical likelihood of deviance37. Further drivers like the influential reports 
Helping with Enquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively38 and Policing with Intelligence39 
coalesced into the emergence of the National Intelligence Model in 1999 which became 
the roadmap for how police should collect and use intelligence40. Thus, when online 
social media arrive, capturing intelligence from these sources was a useful and natural 
progression for police.  
 
OSINT is generally defined as the collection, analysis and use of data from openly 
available sources, for intelligence purposes.41  This includes the mining of social media 
intelligence (SOCMINT).42  Some legal commentators have argued that OSINT data is 
data on a public website that is accessible without further authorisation or controls 43. 
The precise categories of SOCMINT are discussed in depth at p XX below.  
 
Generally, SOCMINT involves the analysis of social media to understand and measure 
the ‘visage of millions of people digitally arguing, talking, joking, condemning and ap-
plauding’ online, in order to ‘identify criminal activity, indicate early warning of out-
breaks of disorder, provide information and intelligence about groups and individuals, 
and help understand and respond to public concerns’.44 Bartlett and others in an im-
portant report for the thinktank Demos (hereinafter the “Demos report”) highlight the 
importance of aggregated social media data for conducting sentiment analysis or trend 
analysis45 and note the value of crowd-sourcing information from individuals and how 
listening to social media via “powerful ‘big data’ acquisition and analytics tools can 
help the police spot emerging events, piece together networks and groups, discern pub-
lic attitudes and improve situational awareness” 46. Examples of operational OSINT 
and SOCMINT systems include the EU Virtuoso OSINT platform47, which provides a 
toolkit to pull together OSINT for law enforcement strategic decision making, and Ray-
theon’s RIOT (Rapid Information Overlay Technology) OSINT big data analytics sys-
tem48 which tracks a subject over different social networking sites using past location 
                                                
37 M Feeley and J Simon, “The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategies of Corrections and Its 
Implications” (1992) 30 Criminology 449 at pp 452-454; K Haggerty and R Ericson, Policing the Risk 
Society (Clarendon, 1997). 
38 Audit Commission, Helping with Enquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively (Audit Commission 1993). 
39 HMI Constabulary Policing with Intelligence (HMIC 1997). 
40 A. James, Examining Intelligence Led Policing: Developments in Research, Policy and Practice 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) pp 81-86. 
41 BJ Koops, J Hoepman and  R Leenes, “Open source intelligence and privacy by design” (2013) 29 
Computer Law and Security Review 676. 
42 BJ Koops, “Police Investigations in Internet Open Sources: Procedural Law Issues” (2013) 29 Com-
puter Law and Security Review 654. 
43 I Walden, Computer Crimes and Digital Investigations (Oxford University Press, 2007); N Seitz 
“Transborder search: A new perspective in law enforcement?”(2005) 7 Yale Journal of Law and Tech-
nology 24.  
44 D Omand, J Bartlett and C Miller   #Intelligence (Demos, 2012) at http://www.de-
mos.co.uk/files/_Intelligence_-_web.pdf?1335197327  . 
45 J Bartlett et al Policing in an Information Age (Demos, 2013). Hereafter the “Demos report”. The 
legal (and ethical) analysis in this report was it appears partly updated in Part 4 of  J Bartlett and L 
Reynolds The state of the art 2015:  a  literature review of social media intelligence capabilities for 
counter- terrorism (Demos, September 2015, hereafter “Demos 2015”).  
46 Ibid at 6. 
47 Koops, supra n 42.  
48 S Vaughan-Nicols, “Raytheon Riot: Defense Spying is Coming to Social Networks” , ZDNet, 12 
February 2013 at http://www.zdnet.com/raytheon-riot-defense-spying-is-coming-to-social-networks-
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(e.g. from ‘check ins’ on services like Foursquare or metadata in photographs published 
online) and network associations/relationships49.  
 
Clearly such data can be invaluable to the police, but the Demos report also sounds a 
note of caution over police adoption of these new resources without proper considera-
tion of privacy, trust and public confidence. Under the British National Security Strat-
egy, they point out, “security and intelligence work in general is predicated not only 
on the public’s consent and understanding, but also on the active partnership and par-
ticipation of people and communities. Serious and recognised damage to security oc-
curs when the state’s efforts are not accepted or trusted”. 50 Accordingly the report  
concluded that police use of SOCMINT must be “grounded in respect for human rights 
and the associated principles of accountability, proportionality and necessity”51.  
 
4. Contemporary police use of social media: the London Riots, 2011, and beyond  
 
The US has made extensive use of SOCMINT for some while : eg,  in a 2012 survey 
of 1,221 federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, four out of five law en-
forcement professionals stated they used social media for investigations52 .  The US has 
also been a leader in the use of such data for predictive profiling: solutions like IBM 
Predictive analytics use crime statistics, statistical analysis/modelling, and GIS map-
ping to predict hotspots where police can target resources. Famously, the Memphis Po-
lice Department in the US claim this system has reduced serious crime overall by 30% 
since its introduction.53 Crowd-sourcing intelligence, via social media (or bespoke 
apps, as with Facewatch below) has however proved to have pitfalls in the US experi-
ence. Twitter and Reddit were used extensively to assist in identification of suspects in 
the investigation of the Boston Marathon Bombings of 201354 but notoriously, this pub-
lic involvement lead to the false identification and victimisation of an innocent individ-
ual. 55  
 
                                                
7000011191/ ; R Gallagher “Software that Tracks People on Social Media Created by Defense Firm” 
The Guardian , 10 February 2013 at  http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/10/software-tracks-
social-media-defence. 
49 A broad overview of the various SOCMINT techniques was conducted by Bartlett and Miller for De-
mos; see  The State of the Art: A Literature Review of Social Media Intelligence Capabilities for Coun-
ter-Terrorism (Demos, 2013) 
50 D Omand, J Bartlett and C Miller, supra n 31 at 7; D Omand, J Bartlett and C Miller for Cabinet Of-
fice, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy (HMSO 2010), p 5. 
51 Ibid at 23. 
52 LexisNexis “Law Enforcement Personnel Use of Social Media in Investigations: Summary of Find-
ings” (LexisNexis Risk Solutions Government, 2012) 
53 IBM, ‘Memphis PD: Keeping ahead of criminals by finding the “hot spots’’’ IBM Press Release Feb 
2011 at http://www.ibm.com/smarterplanet/us/en/leadership/memphispd/assets/pdf/IBM_Mem-
phisPD.pdf . 
54 J O’Mahony “Boston Marathon Bombs: How Investigators use Technology to Identify subjects’ The 
Telegraph, 19 April 2013 at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/social-media/10005569/Boston-
Marathon-bombs-how-investigators-use-technology-to-identify-suspects.html ; T Simonite,  “How Fa-
cial Recognition Tech Could Help Trace Terrorism Suspects” MIT Technology Review, 18 April 2013  
at http://www.technologyreview.com/news/513901/how-facial-recognition-tech-could-help-trace-ter-
rorism-suspects/. 
55 R Sanchez “Boston Marathon Bombings: How Social Media Identified Wrong Suspects”  Telegraph, 
19 April 2013  at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/10006028/Boston-
marathon-bombings-how-social-media-identified-wrong-suspects.html. 
 Page 9 of 29	
In the UK and EU, partly due to lack of resources, usage has emerged more slowly. 
Trottier in 2015 described use of SOCMINT by police in 13 countries in the EU as well 
as the UK, as still “in	a	formative	stage”56.	 The pivotal incident in the UK where social 
media came to the fore in police was the so-called “London riots” of August 2011, 
driven initially by anti-austerity protestors but also involving widespread looting and 
criminality in London and beyond. Police in London intercepted and made use of en-
crypted Blackberry instant messages;57 cooperation was ongoing between Blackberry 
owner RIM and law enforcement authorities to assist in apprehension of suspects58 and 
activity on Twitter was tracked via hash tags such as #ukuncut59. In the wake of the 
London riots, London police created a Flickr account, and uploaded photos of suspects, 
asking members of the public to identify anyone they recognised. 770 people were ar-
rested, and 167 charged as a result.60 2,800 CCTV images taken during the riots were 
also uploaded to the mobile app, Facewatch, which individuals could use to identify 
suspects for the police.61 In Manchester62, where rioting also occurred, information was 
crowd-sourced across both physical and online space (mainly Facebook and Flickr)  in 
“Operation Shop a Looter” Campaigns through local broadcast media in conjunction 
with posters and electronic displays asked the public to name and shame suspects 
around the city (particularly at train stations, cinemas and bar complexes)63.  
 
Subsequent to the London riots, a number of reviews (discussed below) considered 
what mistakes had been made during the riots in relation to the use of social media. 
Lessons learned were eagerly applied during the London Olympics the following 
year. In 2012, ahead of the London Olympics, some 2,565 intelligence reports were 
created, following analysis of 31 million items across 56,000 social-media platforms. 
More recently, photographs and geotags posted by foreign fighters in Syria have been 
used extensively to identify their likely locations and travel routes, and to build mate-
rial and evidence for investigations64.  
 
The UK has also begun, like the US, to specifically use predictive profiling, drawing 
on social media as one among several sources, as a tool of criminal investigation. The 
                                                
56 D Trottier “Open Source Intelligence, Social Media and Law Enforcement: Visions, Constraints and 
Critiques” (2015) 18 (4-5) European Journal of Cultural Studies 542. 
57 V Dodd, ‘Police accessed BlackBerry messages to thwart planned riots’ The Guardian (London Au-
gust 16 2011); K Wynn, and K Blyth, “Predicting a riot: at what price privacy?” Practical Law Com-
pany  at http://uk.practicallaw.com/9-507-6354 
58 C Williams, “London Riots: BlackBerry Manufacturer offers to help police”, Telegraph, August 8 
2011 at  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/blackberry/8689313/London-riots-BlackBerry-manu-
facturer- offers-to-help-police-in-any-way-we-can.html. 
59 J Ball and P Lewis “Twitter and the Riots: How the News Spread”, Guardian, 7 Dec 2011 at 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/dec/07/twitter-riots-how-news-spread. 
60 Demos report , supra n 45, p 2. 
61 The system was used in the West Midlands in 2013 too, with 200 images uploaded, and 9 arrests 
made : see BBC News, “Crowd-sourcing used to trace London Riot suspects”, 26 June 2012 at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-18589273;  BBC News “Facewatch app shares CCTV 
Images of West Midlands Suspects”, 24 May 2013 at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-
22656258. 
62E Pieri, “Emergent policing Practice: Operation Shop a Looter and Urban Space Securitisation in the 
aftermath of the Manchester 2011 Riots” (2014) 12 Surveillance and Society 1, 38. 
63 Interestingly, during this operation, police also targeted specific known offenders, by using Auto-
matic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) to track number plates of cars belonging to convicted crimi-
nals, to stop them from entering central Manchester during the unrest; see Pieri  supra at 44  
64 See RUSI report, supra n 10, para 3.65. 
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US developed IBM Predictive system, noted above,  was trialed by the Ministry of 
Justice and various UK police departments in 201065 . More recently, the EMOTIVE 
project used an OSINT approach to plot the mood of the nation via Twitter. The exper-
imental software scans up to 2000 tweets a second and rates them on a scale of eight 
emotional expressions, to assist in identifying geo-specific civil unrest, track potential 
criminal behaviour or early threats to public safety 66. PredPol, a software system de-
signed to aid in predictive profiling, has been adopted by a number of UK police forces 
including Kent since early 2013. Prospective Mapping West Yorkshire Police, is used 
to forecast hotspots for burglary and theft from vehicles67. Predictive profiling has also 
been explicitly embraced as a valuable tool in an era of austerity68. In response to this 
expanded uptake, the College of Policing issued explicit national guidance on collec-
tion and use of open intelligence in 201569. A large number of research initiatives at 
UK and EU level continue to explore the use of SOCMINT for predicting crime, its 
location and occurrence patterns: a recent major project is the ePOOLICE system , 
which links police data to social media data to identify new crime trends in cybercrime, 
human trafficking and drug trafficking70. With the creation of the Metropolitan Police 
special open source intelligence unit in 2013, OSINT and SOCMINT seem on the 
agenda for the foreseeable future71. 
 
4.1 Problems with SOCMINT uptake by UK police 
 
A number of reports following the London Riots considered the use of OSINT and 
SOCINT intelligence by the police. The Metropolitan Police Service 5 Days in August: 
Strategic Review into the Disorder of August 2011 report found that social media was 
a primary source of information during the riots, with 19% of total information reports 
assessed by their intelligence body relating to social networking sites, and 14% relating 
to BBM (337 and 249 out of 1554 reports respectively). Nevertheless, they highlighted 
that there were insufficient resources to manage the volume of data in real time, includ-
ing open source data, with the lack of automated search tools slowing progress.  Avail-
able tools were optimised for business intelligence gathering, not policing.72 
 
                                                
65 T Thomson “Crime Software may help police predict violent offences”   Guardian, 25 July 2010 at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/jul/25/police-software-crime-prediction ; IBM, ‘Ministry of Justice 
Chooses IBM Predictive Analytics to Make Streets Safe’aIBM Press Release, 16 March 2010. 
66 BBC News “Computer Program uses Twitter to “map mood of nation”  September 7 2013  at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-24001692 . 
67 Both described in M Fielding  and V Jones “Disrupting the optimal forager’: predictive risk mapping 
and domestic burglary reduction in Trafford, Greater Manchester” (2011) 14 International Journal of 
Police Science and Management 30. 
68 See HMIC Policing in austerity: Rising to the challenge (2014) and discussion of Kent use of  Pred-
Pol at p 63. 
69 See College of Policing Intelligence collection, development and dissemination (2015) at  
https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/intelligence-management/intelligence-cycle/ . Interest-
ingly the guidance notes that open intelligence may not be “accurate, reliable or valid”, is not subject to 
the same quality standards as closed sources and should be corroborated by supporting evidence.  
70 See POSTnote 470 “Big Data, Crime and Security” 2014. 
71 See P Wright “Meet PRISM’s Little Brother: SOCMINT” Wired, 26 June 2013; Social media intelli-
gence technology: Home Office funding, FOI release, 22 August 2013. 
72 Metropolitan Police Service, Four Days in August: A Strategic Review into the Disorder of August 
2011 (Met Police Service 2012) 105. 
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Meanwhile a Review by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate Constabulary proposed a New Na-
tional Framework of “Rules of Engagement” for resolving public disorder in the wake 
of the 2011 London Riots.73 Beyond broader police planning and tactical strategies for 
mobilisation, this framework proposed a “central information hub to help them [police] 
anticipate disorder by drawing together all available information, including from di-
rect contact with members of the community and social media monitoring”.74 Signifi-
cantly, the report noted that police often felt overwhelmed by the volume of social me-
dia data available. One interviewed officer compared the process of finding useful ma-
terial to “searching the British Library for a page in a book, without an index to refer 
to”.75 
 
These reports highlighted the need for police to improve technical and organisational 
capabilities to extract and analyse SOCMINT. A third, non-state report, the LSE/Guard-
ian “Reading the Riots” Report76 helped highlight methodological issues in use of 
SOCMINT data for policing. For example, one prominent question was whether social 
media had helped incite the riots77 or alternately helped combat them and restore nor-
mality afterwards. The report found evidence that Facebook and Twitter were not as 
heavily used as Blackberry Messenger texts during the London Riots; and Twitter was 
more heavily used to coordinate the subsequent clean-up campaign than to organise 
illegal behaviour. However, Omand, Bartlett and Miller have argued this could not be 
proven because the 2.6 million tweets analysed in the project were collected via 150 
hashtag clouds. Tweets lacking a specific hashtag e.g. #londonriots would systemati-
cally be excluded from the dataset. Users co-ordinating criminal looting via Twitter 
might not wish to broadcast this using hashtags, hence rendering dubious the empirical 
basis of the assertion.78  
 
The reliability and quality of OSINT and SOCMINT, and of data mining and profiling 
in a policing context generally, has been recognised as an increasingly serious issue 
since 2011. Certainly the recent rash of social media prosecutions has demonstrated 
that what people say on line will often not reflect their real intentions – Paul Chambers, 
for example, did not really mean to blow up Doncaster Airport,79 nor did most the abus-
ers of Criado-Perez80, one assumes,  really intend to rape her. This does not (in any 
way) mean that social media abuse is not a vice which should not be investigated or 
prosecuted by police under appropriate laws,81 but it does raise worries, in an era char-
acterised (as discussed above) by automated profiling and predictive policing, that 
SOCMINT profiling, combined with the well-known online “disinhibition effect”, will 
produce bad data, which will lead to bad arrests, bad prosecutions and possibly even 
                                                
73 Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, Review into the Disorder of August (hereafter “HMIC, 
2011”) . 
74 HMIC , 2011 at 6. 
75 HMIC, 2011 at 31. 
76 Lewis et al, supra n 8. 
77 At one point David Cameron actually threatened powers to close down social media in times of 
emergency. See BBC News, “David Cameron considers banning suspected rioters from social media”, 
11 August 2011, at http://www.theguardian.com/media/2011/aug/11/david-cameron-rioters-social-me-
dia . 
78 Omand et al, supra n 31 at  9. 
79 See Chambers v DPP [2012] EWHC 2157 (Admin). 
80 Criado-Perez  story, The Guardian (London, 16 December 2013) at http://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2013/dec/16/two-charged-caroline-criado-perez-tweets. 
81 Dominic McGoldrick “The Limits of Freedom of Expression on Facebook and Social networking 
Sites: a UK perspective” (2013) 13 (1) Human Rights Law Review 125. 
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bad convictions. Social science researchers in the area also increasingly express dismay 
that data mined from corpora of (say) tweets fail in meeting basic social science meth-
odological standard. Issues such as sampling, standardisation of populations and exclu-
sion or under representation of certain populations, such as the poor, sub-literate or 
technophobic are often ignored. While important, this issue is beyond the main focus 
of this paper. 
 
5. Legal regulation of  SOCMINT 
 
Above, we have already classified SOCMINT as either open (accessible to the world) 
or closed (restricted by Friends locks, passwords, encryption etc). For the purposes of 
this section we extend this taxonomy further to four classes of social media data. 
 
1. Information (open or closed) which does not (at least prima facie) re-
late to a living person who is identified or identifiable (“personal data82” in the 
terminology of the DPD) eg, aggregated data about views on local transport, 
bus timetables posted online.   This material is irrelevant to the concerns of 
this paper so long as it remains anonymous or anonymised83. 
 
2. Information which is open and does relate to a living person who is 
identified or identifiable.  This is the main focus of this paper. 
 
3. Information which is open or closed, but is accessed by police via de-
ceptive, covert or misleading tactics : eg acquiring access to Friends-locked 
posts on Facebook via befriending as an invented person with a fake profile; 
“listening in” on a protected group after joining  with an anonymous profile;  
leveraging certain public responses on Twitter via presentation of provocative  
messages not truly held by the police observer; searching for content via 
Google or other engine despite the content provider indicating via the ro-
bots.txt standard that they wished this information not to be spidered.  
 
4. Information which is closed but is accessed via technical “back door” 
access, eg email or direct message interception by wiretapping technologies; 
acquiring traffic logs of communications from ISPs84.  
 
                                                
82 See Art 2 (h), DPD 1995 transposed into the DPA 1998 s1(1). 
83 This phrase can be misleading given the potential reidentifiability of much anonymous data in a 
world of data mining and “big data”. In the examples given above it is not at all unlikely that views 
could be reidentified to a particular speaker. Again this important topic cannot be examined in depth in 
this paper. See the seminal discussion in P Ohm ‘Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Sur-
prising Failure of Anonymization’, (2010) 57 UCLA Law Review 1701. 
84 Into this category also arguably falls access to social media by law enforcement authorities and secu-
rity services via extralegal, or at least legally unclear and secret programmes. As disclosed by Edward 
Snowden, such surveillance and intelligence acquisition programmes are now known to be run by the 
US NSA, the UK’s GCHQ and probably the intelligence agencies of many other countries. The discov-
ery of PRISM, TEMPORA etc. is clearly of considerable importance in the whole debate about regula-
tion of intelligence gathering from social media, but it is not, as discussed above, the main focus of this 
paper which is devoted to how conventional police and law enforcement authorities acquire intelli-
gence in what must be seen to be justifiable and transparent manners. 
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The primary instrument which currently regulates acquisition of communications and 
records by law enforcement authorities in the UK is the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) 85. It should be noted that police acquisition and processing 
of personal data is exempt from much of DP law86 under the exemptions for the detec-
tion and prevention of crime87. Notably, there is no requirement for UK data subjects 
to consent to the police collecting or otherwise processing their data, nor do they have 
rights to request access to what data is held about them by the police (“subject access 
rights”, or SARs)88. Data processing by the police will also not always fall under the 
supervision of the UK DP regulator, the Information Commissioner, since other regu-
lators have a specific role eg the Interception of Communications Commissioner89.  
Retention of data, the security of its storage, and other matters addressed by the Se-
cond to Eighth Data Protection Principles90 are however key areas where DP rules are 
still applicable to policing.  
 
Overarching the domestic laws of the UK Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) is art 8 of 
the ECHR, which guarantees the right to respect for private life as a fundamental 
right. A number of challenges to the legality of RIPA in terms of art 8 have already 
been taken to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR); however the basic le-
gality of the scheme, at least before the Snowden revelations, was confirmed in Ken-
nedy v UK.91  
 
As  a key a priori question, we will now consider whether personal data disclosed in 
public on social media should attract privacy protection, and if so, how much. 
 
6. Does open SOCMINT have any protection in law as “private”? 
 
6.1 Norms and law : DP, RIPA and the new IP Bill 
                                                
85 Internet related matters and telecoms are generally dealt with as reserved matters to the UK Parlia-
ment. We shall not in this paper consider the legal specialities of Scotland which has its own criminal 
justice and evidence system and thus amends Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA 
2000) to some extent within the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Sc) Act 2000. 
86 See however the potential introduction of a draft directive on data protection in police and criminal 
matters: Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of 
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal 
penalties, and the free movement of such data /* COM/2012/010 Final - 2012/0010 (COD)  at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52012PC0010>. 
87 DPD 1995, art 3(2); DPA 1998 ss 28, 29.  
88 DPA 1998, s 7 and s 29(2) . 
89 During the London riots the Information Commissioner made it plain that he claimed no jurisdiction 
over police acquisition of social media, texts etc and would not comment on its legality. See Infor-
mation Commissioner Office Disclosure Log, (14 October 2011)  at http://ico.org.uk/~/media/docu-
ments/disclosure_log/IRQ0417298.ashx.  RIPA does however come under the supervision of the Inves-
tigatory Powers Tribunal.  The complicated supervisory arrangements in RIPA and adjunct legislation 
are likely to be overhauled and simplified with the creation of one “super regulator” for investigatory 
powers in the IP Bill. 
90 DPA 1998, Sched 1. 
91 (2010) 50 EHRR 45. Though see now Davis case, supra n 16 and further challenges to RIPA after 
Snowden are apparently pending in both ECtHR and the ECJ. It should also be noted that the EC Char-
ter of Rights contains separate rights both to data protection and to respect for privacy; and these differ-
ent concepts have been deployed in recent ECJ case law eg Google Spain, infra n 150  and are thus  
significant to the UK even though the UK has not signed up to the Charter. 
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First reactions to the idea that there should be some kind of legal control of the collec-
tion of open SOCMINT tend to run into a priori objections of the following kind:  
“Of course police can read public posts  - they’re public!”92. Legal experts, if con-
cerned at all, have mostly responded in a similar way. For example, Gillespie, a lead-
ing commenter on online criminal law, asserts that: 
 
“[W]hen postings are public and available for all to see it is unlikely that it 
could be concluded that the viewing of the information is covert in that there 
must be an awareness that those in authority could look at the postings”.93  
 
DP law may also support this position. Art 8(2)(e) on special categories of data (sensi-
tive personal data in UK terminology) normally requires explicit consent for the pro-
cessing of such data but exempts “data which are manifestly made public by the data 
subject”. It is not clear if this means that data which is not sensitive  should be ex-
empted from the requirement for a legal ground of processing under art 7 - but it 
would seem to follow. Furthermore, as pointed out above, the police are exempted 
from DP rules requiring a lawful ground for the acquisition of personal data. 
 
But not all writers see things as this uncomplicated. In the US, as an interesting com-
parison from a very different legal system, Bartow, drawing on Semitsu, comments 
that: “Facebook [is] a giant surveillance tool, no warrant required, which the govern-
ment can use in a mind bogglingly creative range of ways with almost no practical 
constraints from existing laws”. 94 For Bartow, social media surveillance is a covert 
device to evade the generally strong US Fourth Amendment protections against war-
rantless search of private material. “[W]e barely notice that Facebook leaves us al-
most completely vulnerable to searches and seizures triggered by invasive but mostly 
invisible government surveillance”, she protests.95   
 
We note three points rebutting the “obviousness” of the notion that SOCMINT should 
have no protection as private matter because someone has chosen to voluntarily dis-
close their personal and private life to the world.  
 
First, what can be gathered from open SOCMINT  is not just the most obvious part, 
the substantive content, eg text, pictures, videos or links posted96. For intelligence 
                                                
92 See for interesting sentiments along this line, a police forum online PoliceServices.com at 
http://www.policespecials.com/forum/index.php/topic/116579-ripa-requirement-required-for-social-
networking-sites/  eg “Sailor”: “You don't need a RIPA authorisation to monitor what people post pub-
licly on the internet”, 23 February 2011. 
93 A Gillespie, ‘Regulation of Internet Surveillance” (2009) 4 European Human Rights Law Review 
552. 
94 J Semitsu, ‘From Facebook to Mug Shot: How the Death of Social Networking Privacy Rights Revo-
lutionized Online Government Surveillance’ (2011) 31 Pace Law Review 1, 291-381; Ann Bartow ‘Fa-
cebook and the Fourth Amendment: Expecting Any Privacy May be Unreasonable” Jotwell (18 April 
2011)  at http://cyber.jotwell.com/2011/04/. 
95 To make matters worse in the US, police scrutiny even of closed social media content also does not 
breach privacy according to Semitsu. 
96 d boyd, It’s Complicated: the Social Lives of Networked Teens (Yale University Press, New Haven 
2014)  
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purposes, one of the most useful pieces of data that can be extracted from a social me-
dia profile is the network of friends or “social graph”. Interestingly, on Facebook, the 
world’s most popular social network, it has until recently been impossible, and is still 
very hard, to shield the Friends list from public exposure97.  Similarly, Twitter now by 
default sets tweets to reveal the location from which they were tweeted98. Although 
these settings can be reversed, many users will not know how or bother. Thus valua-
ble location data becomes available to those with access to the Twitter Application 
Program Interfaces (APIs) 99. 
 
A second obvious but significant point is that social media content about an identified 
or identifiable person is often not posted by that data subject. On closed Facebook 
profiles, a photo might be “tagged” with the name of a person who might not even 
themselves have a Facebook account, and so have no access or notice to remove the 
tag. Information may quite conceivably be “cut and pasted” from Friends locked pro-
files eg by hackers, or ex-es100.  
 
Finally, privacy settings vary from platform to platform and also change constantly 
over time in a way that requires constant vigilance of users to maintain a privacy sta-
tus quo. Different privacy settings, and different changes, apply to different types of 
content eg posts, comments, groups, photos, friends list etc. On most sites, as with Fa-
cebook, the overwhelming motivation is to make as much material as possible public 
to maximise growth of audience and collection of data for marketing revenue. Hence 
it is well known that many users are deluded in their belief they have adequately pro-
tected their privacy via code controls.101 Indeed Madejski, Johnson and Bellovin  
found that in a small study of 65 university students, every one had incorrectly man-
aged some of their Facebook privacy settings, thus displaying some personal data to 
unwanted eyes.102 
   
Put together, all these points show that, contrary to popular belief, control of what 
data about you is made public on social media is not simply a matter of easy volun-
tary choice. Accordingly the common retort – if you didn’t want people (like the po-
lice) to read it, why did you make it public? – is not in fact a sensible question to ask. 
We would argue this contributes strongly to an argument that material placed on 
                                                
97 Kurt Wagner “Your Private Facebook Friends List Isn't Actually That Private”, Mashable (New 
York 2 June 2014)   at http://mashable.com/2014/06/02/facebook-friends-list-privacy/. 
98 Note the Twitter privacy policy as of 3 November 2014: “Our default is almost always to make the 
information you provide public for as long as you do not delete it from Twitter, but we generally give 
you settings to make the information more private if you want.” At https://twitter.com/privacy.   
99 APIs are bespoke packages of tools provided to developers in an accessible interface that they can 
use to build applications. 
100 Information posted privately is increasingly often hacked and shared “for the lulz” (fun) or for other 
purposes such as revenge or blackmail: a recent high profile case involved the hacking from the iCloud 
of celebrity nude pictures including Jennifer Lawrence. See Samuel Gibbs “Google removes results 
linking to stolen photos of Jennifer Lawrence nude”, The Guardian , 20 October 2014 at  
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/oct/20/google-search-results-linking-stolen-nude-pho-
tos-jennifer-lawrence . 
101 L Edwards, ‘Privacy, Law, Code and Social Networking Sites’ in I. Brown, Research Handbook on 
Governance of the Internet (Edward Elgar,  2013) at 321. 
102  M Madejski, M Johnson and S Bellovin “The Failure of Online Social Network Privacy Settings”, 
(Tech Report CUCS-010-11, Columbia University, 2011) 
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“open” social media can still carry with it reasonable expectations of privacy. (Or in 
DP terms, may not have been “manifestly” made public.) 
 
Turning to our major case study of the UK, the obvious place to look for any protec-
tion in law against police acquisition and use of open SOCMINT is, as noted above, 
in RIPA, which is supposed to be the main instrument governing the police’s investi-
gatory and interception powers103. However there is little evidence that the police re-
gard RIPA as constraining their activities in our paradigm case, that of gathering large 
amounts of  open SOCMINT and data mining it for profiling purposes. While there is 
no authoritative guidance or case law on this point, the Demos reports of 2013 and 
2015104 have been influential in the field, as has the academic work of O’Floinn and 
Ormerod105. The Demos reports, especially the more recent one, claim as their norma-
tive basis that there are neither reasonable personal expectations of privacy protec-
tion, nor such expectations by society, in respect of SOCMINT collection.  The 2015 
report emphasises this as still true even after the public reaction to the Snowden reve-
lations on social media surveillance. They justify the first assertion on the basis that 
where users disclose open SOCMINT, they do so knowing that the terms and condi-
tions of the site almost invariably state their data may be shared with others. Further-
more, the Demos reports also assert that if the site allows acquisition of data by API, 
this also means the user should have expected their posts to be open to public acquisi-
tion. We strongly reject these assertions and note a number of reasons below p xx 
why we do not feel this approach does or should reflect the reality of social media 
use106. 
 
The Demos reports do suggest that, in some circumstances, the acquisition of 
SOCMINT will require some kind of authorisation for police -  but not under Pt 1 of 
RIPA, which was supposed by most to be the portion of the Act dedicated to digital 
investigations. Instead Demos found applicable restrictions under Pt II or RIPA, 
which covers rules relating to police collection of evidence via directed surveillance 
and covert intelligence tactics eg such real world activities as following suspects, be-
friending their relatives or girlfriends and even in some extreme cases entering rela-
tionships with these kind of sources107. 
 
                                                
103 Though note that much digital evidence is still eg reportedly acquired as “production” evidence un-
der the rules of PACE in England and Wales and this is a legal alternative to RIPA as confirmed in R 
(NTL Group Ltd) v Ipswich Crown Court [2002] EWHC 1585 (Admin). One likely outcome of the new 
IP Bill may be to reduce this regulatory overlap. 
104 Supra n 49. 
105 M O’Floinn and D Ormerod “Social networking sites, RIPA and Criminal Investigations” (2011) 10 
Criminal Law Review 766. 
106 Demos state that a number of types of SOCMINT data do not carry obvious risks to the personal 
privacy of users – eg anonymous or aggregated SOCMINT – or where the user has clearly explicitly 
given permission to use or share personal data – eg  responses to crowdsourced police appeals for in-
formation on social media. We do not take issue with these as not carrying any reasonable expectation 
of privacy. 
107 Such undercover operations have been sometimes found to be both inadequately unauthorised and 
actionable in damages – see eg. “Police apologise to women who had relationships with undercover 
officers”, Guardian, 20 November 2015    at  http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/nov/20/met-
police-apologise-women-had-relationships-with-undercover-officers . 
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Firstly, on some occasions, “directed covert surveillance” authorisation under Pt II of 
RIPA may be required. Directed surveillance108 is surveillance109, which is covert, 
conducted in such a manner as is likely to result in the obtaining of private infor-
mation about a person, and for the purposes of a specific investigation and not as an 
immediate response to events (eg following a suspect from a mugging).  A directed 
surveillance authorisation is obtained not from a judge or politician but internally 
from a senior police officer110. “Private information” is defined widely in s 26(10) to 
include “any information relating to private or family life”. 111 Hence it is quite possi-
ble to imagine “private” matter being gathered by covert surveillance of SOCMINT.   
 
Useful examples of what Demos suggest need authorisation under this category in-
clude:  
(a) where a detailed profile is built of a named individual from openly availa-
ble sources, especially where this requires either automated or manual 
name recognition techniques (see further discussion of Rotaru below, n 
125 ).   
(b) where data is collected from a public platform which is technically open 
but where a reasonable expectation of privacy still exists eg a Facebook 
page set up for members of a school hobby club or local choir. 
 
O’Floinn and Ormerod argue however that where a police officer calculates112 the tar-
get will be unaware of surveillance - which may be often true in cases of  social media 
scraping, web search engine “spidering” etc – case law points towards a need for cov-
ert surveillance authority. Contra Gillespie above p 92, we agree. This would indicate 
a much wider obligation for police to obtain directed surveillance authorisations in re-
spect of SOCMINT than appears to be current practice.  
 
Secondly, the Demos report argues that some acts of SOCMINT collection require au-
thorisation as surveillance involving “covert human intelligence sources” (CHIS). 
The most obvious case here is where police gain access to closed posts, profiles or 
groups via the construction of fake profiles. It is well known that the UK police have 
routinely created fake profiles for some investigations  eg posing as children on plat-
forms such as Bebo to try to initiate grooming advances. A slightly less obviously in-
vasive technique is to “hang out” using a false identity or at least, not the identity of a 
policeman, on any forum, open or closed, in order to elicit statements or information, 
possibly by “astroturfing” – expressing fake “grassroots” or provocative views.  
 
Finally in some circumstances both Demos and O’Floinn and Ormerod propose that 
the rules of Pt1, Ch1 of RIPA on interception of communications may be relevant. By 
analogy with known mechanisms such as email interception, it seems tempting to say 
that acquiring access to a Direct Message (private one-to-one communication) on say 
                                                
108 RIPA 2000, s 26(2).  
109 RIPA 2000, s 48(2), where it is defined widely to include monitoring, observing or listening to per-
sons, their movements, conversations, activities etc as well as recording such movements etc, and using 
“surveillance devices”. 
110 RIPA s 28. 
111 Home Office Revised Code of Practice for Covert Surveillance and Property Interference  (HMSO 
2014), supra nxx. 
112 Supra n XX. 
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Facebook or Twitter, or to a Friends-locked private post, by technical “backdoor” 
methods, should require an interception warrant and Demos support this. The case for 
a reasonable expectation in such circumstances seems undeniable. In fact however it 
is very hard to analogise social media interception to phonecall or email interception.  
 
The main issue is that interception can only be authorised under RIPA when the com-
munication is “in the course of transmission”.113 A DM  or Friends-locked comment 
written to Facebook (say) has arguably been conclusively transmitted and so cannot 
then be intercepted. However s 2(7) of RIPA extends the period of transmission to: 
“any time when the system ... is used for storing it in a manner that enables the in-
tended recipient to collect it or otherwise have access to it”.  
 
This would arguably extend the period of “transmission” until sometime after a post 
or comment had been posted, but while the “intended recipient” still needed to “oth-
erwise have access” to it ie until they actually read it.  In R v Coulson114  however (a 
phone-hacking case) the judge concluded that voicemail messages stored for future 
access remained “in transmission” even after they had arrived, and even after they had 
been listened to. This was partly on the basis that these messages were tied to the mo-
bile operator’s proprietary system and could not be easily moved to “offline” storage 
to be referred to at leisure. Whether this reasoning is also true of social media posts – 
they are also tied to proprietary non-interoperable platforms  - as text, they are also 
much more easily “cut and pasted”  than voicemails. It remains an open problem if an 
interception warrant could appropriately be issued even after a social media post had 
been read and perhaps replied to115.  In effect this would mean the interception regime 
would be appropriate for an indefinite length of time which seems the opposite of the 
“realtime” interception RIPA intends.  
 
The new regime proposed to replace RIPA’s rules on interception in the IP Bill (as in-
troduced in November 2015) would arguably place such “back door” police access 
under the new concept of “interference with computer equipment”, or legalised hack-
ing (Part V of the Bill)116. In the new proposed scheme, such interference requires, 
like interception, a dual authorisation by the relevant Secretary of State and a judge, 
except in emergency situations. This seems to recognize hacking as equivalent in 
level of severity of interference with “conventional” interception in the current RIPA 
framework. Although the entire application of both RIPA and quite possibly the IP 
Bill to SOCMINT is deeply unhelpful, this particular alteration to  requiring the so-
called “double lock” of judicial and political  authorisation,  might be helpful. 
 
6.1.1 Will any of this be clearer under the new proposed IP Bill? 
 
                                                
113 RIPA s 2(2).   
114 [2013] All ER (D) 287. 
115 The matter is complicated even further by the fact that, after criticism from data protection authori-
ties, Facebook now allow users to download their entire Facebook page to another host or storage me-
dium (but not, say, merely their entire photo album). 
116 Demos supra n 45 also argue that the use of “keylogger” or Trojan viruses to gain passwords to 
locked accounts should be viewed as “interception”. While the UK lacks case law on this topic, in Ger-
many, use of such keyloggers by police has already been held by their Constitutional Court to infringe 
a new privacy sub-right of integrity of computer systems – see W Abel “Agents, Trojans and Tags: The 
Next Generation of Investigators” (2009) 23 (1-2 )International Review of Law, Computers and Tech-
nology 99. 
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It is difficult to make any firm statements about a Bill in passage and especially one 
so complex and controversial that its meaning is likely still to be hotly disputed when 
it has passed. However the obvious answer is no, for at least three reasons. 
 
First, the Bill, perhaps unsurprisingly, takes no steps towards an overt recognition of 
expectations of privacy in SOCMINT (whether open or closed).  
 
Secondly, despite the Bill’s bold claims that “it   will  bring   together   all   of   the   
powers   already   available   to   law enforcement    and    the    security    and    intel-
ligence    agencies    to    obtain communications and data about communications” 
and that “it  will  make  sure  powers are  fit  for  the  digital  age” in fact it still main-
tains a bifurcation between powers regulating  “digital”  investigations in the IP Bill 
and “real world” powers which apparently remain operative in RIPA Pt II. Accord-
ingly, the protection of SOCMINT, such as it is, remains divided uncomfortably be-
tween these regimes.  
 
Thirdly, the new Bill’s powers are so wide ranging and in many cases so little under-
stood by the legal community, that it will be quite easy for new aspects of the Bill  to 
be pressed into service as needed at any point when there is felt to be a need to defend 
the routine acquisition of  bulk SOCMINT. We have already noted that the new re-
gime on interference with computer equipment, might provide an answer to the diffi-
culty of stuffing backdoor access to closed SOCMINT into the badly shaped “inter-
ception” hole.  A similar possible opportunity may lie in the new rules on acquisition 
of “bulk personal datasets”, which are defined in the Bill’s introductory guidance as 
“sets  of  personal  information  about  a  large number  of  individuals,  the  majority  
of  whom will  not be  of  any  interest  to  the  security  and  intelligence  agencies..” 
although the examples  of these  datasets given namely “the telephone directory or the 
electoral roll” seem very far from SOCMINT.  We hope the application of the Bill’s 
new provisions to SOCMINT may be clarified in time through official guidance as 
well as case law. 
 
Our preliminary conclusion at the end of this section is that the principal organ of UK 
law regulating police powers, RIPA, does not appear to offer adequate and consistent 
protection in relation to the acquisition of open SOCMINT. There is no need for polit-
ical let alone judicial warrant, nor even for internal police authorisation, except in the 
very limited and uncertain circumstances described above.  Protection is not based in 
the “digital” part of RIPA but scattered across its parts , and this distinction is main-
tained even if the IP Bill passes in current form. In the next section we consider 
whether, notwithstanding this strong UK view that open SOCMINT on the whole 
does not require legal authorisation for acquisition and use,  support can be found 
from European human rights law for privacy rights in SOCMINT. 
 
6.1 The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
 
The leading international instrument relevant here117 is the ECHR, art 8, which guar-
antees the right to respect for private life, but with extensive exceptions for “national 
                                                
117 It is worth noting parenthetically that the Council of Europe ETS No 185 Convention on cyber-
crime, Budapest, 23.XI.2001, which is not a human rights instrument but takes account of such in 
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security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others”. The UK Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) incorporates 
the ECHR as part of UK domestic law.  Under general principles of the ECHR, any 
restrictions on rights must be based on published, clear and specific legal rules; serve 
a legitimate aim in a democratic society; and be ‘necessary’ and ‘proportionate’ to 
that aim. These restrictions persist even where incursions into privacy rights have 
been justified by states on grounds of national security or prevention or detection of 
crime: as evidenced by a number of prominent ECtHR cases including Weber v Ger-
many118 and Klass v Germany119.  It is clearly the threat of recourse to the ECtHR, as 
well as the desire to engender public trust and co-operation, that leads to some  public 
statements that police use of SOCMINT is legitimate, proportionate and necessary.  
 
Significantly for current purposes, in recent years ECtHR jurisprudence has clearly 
endorsed the notion that expectations of privacy may persist even in public places.  
The leading case is von Hannover v Germany120. Here, Princess Caroline of Monaco 
attempted to prevent pictures being published of her in the German press which did 
not feature public engagements but merely the Princess going about her ordinary life 
in public, eg, going shopping, out for a walk. The ECtHR found that even though 
there was a public interest in the reporting of the activities of public figures, it had to 
be balanced against her rights of privacy to go about in public “off duty”.  The deci-
sive factor was whether the pictures contributed to a public debate of public interest: 
these did not and accordingly her legitimate expectation of privacy prevailed. In the 
UK, the Hannover doctrine has been partially but perhaps not entirely adopted by the 
courts in a series of cases influenced by the Human Rights Act and the leading House 
of Lords decision in Campbell v MGN121.  
  
While most “privacy in public” cases have involved the famous, it is clear that non-
celebrities have even stronger claims since there is usually no countervailing public 
interest. In Peck v UK122, a mentally ill man successfully sued the UK at the ECtHR 
                                                
building a cross-border framework for digital police investigation, states in art 32 that “publicly availa-
ble (open source) stored computer data” can be acquired by police authorities across borders without 
any authorisation of a foreign state. This provision relates to mutual assistance by foreign states, and 
the circumstances and age of this provision (drafted before the rise of social media) make it questiona-
ble if it has any utility in the context of domestic policing. See on updating art 32, the note by M  
O’Floinn “It wasn't all white light before Prism: Law enforcement practices in gathering data abroad, 
and proposals for further transnational access at the Council of Europe”  (2013) 5 Computer Law and 
Security Review 610  at  http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0267364913001428.  
118 (2006) 46 EHRR SE5. 
119 (1978-80) 2 EHRR 21 . 
120 (2005) 40 EHRR 1. 
121 [2004] UKHL 22. Campbell involved the supermodel Naomi Campbell, who successfully argued 
that photos taken of her on the street outside Narcotics Anonymous, thus showing she had lied about 
being free from associations with illegal drugs, were a breach of her privacy. See also Murray v Big 
Pictures (UK) Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 446 (pictures of the author J K Rowling with infant child taken 
without her permission on the streets of her home town) which was another successful claim (on behalf 
of the baby alone) for privacy rights of celebrities in everyday public activity, but interestingly, unlike 
Campbell, had no medical treatment issues (indicating a less strong claim for privacy) but did involve 
an infant plaintiff (indicating a stronger claim, as the infant had not chosen stardom and had the right to 
grow up without constant press intrusion). 
122 (2003) 36 EHRR 41. 
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under art 8 for failing to prevent the transmission on TV of footage of his failed sui-
cide attempt in a public place. What remains unclear is if (or when) art 8 restrains 
mere observation of activity in public, as opposed to its recording, storage, use or dis-
semination. As Koops notes, the fact that the ECtHR has recognised the existence of 
privacy rights in public does not mean that all processing of personal data gathered in 
public interferes with privacy.123 The main ECtHR cases in this area have dealt with 
storage, and in some cases, subsequent use or dissemination of data, rather than its 
mere collection, “leaving open the question whether the mere searching for and con-
sultation of data, without storing or using them, constitutes an interference”.124  
 
The key dictum most often quoted is from Rotaru v Romania125 where it was held 
that: 
 
 “public information can fall within the scope of private life where it is system-
atically collected and stored in files held by the authorities” 
 
Koops asserts this means that collection of information not so systematically pro-
cessed may therefore not constitute infringement of private life. In UK case law, the 
House of Lords has so far only been willing to go as far as saying that the publication 
of data collected in public (eg a photograph snapped in the street) may, exceptionally, 
be objectionable in all the circumstances of the case, but not its mere collection126. 
 
6.1.1  Collection of personal data in public by policing authorities  
 
Most of the leading UK cases on a right to privacy in public to date involve infringe-
ments of privacy by media organisations. Is there a greater or lesser right as against 
the police? On the one hand, the police clearly have a special role and (limited) au-
thorisation to interfere in private spheres to protect the public. On the other hand 
where police overstep their powers, the result is arguably a totalitarian state – a worse 
consequence than where the media over reach. In Wood v Metropolitan Police Com-
missioner127, a protester against the arms trade argued that his privacy was breached 
when a police photographer took pictures of him at the AGM of Reed Elsevier, and 
later attempted to identify him via these and transport documentation. Wood plead 
that his art 8 rights had been infringed. The police argued that there was no permanent 
file on Wood and the pictures were to be kept only for sight of police officers to pre-
vent future crimes.  Mr. Justice McCombe in the High Court noted: 
 
“The majority of the recent high authorities, here and in Strasbourg, are con-
cerned with Article 8 in the context of media intrusion and publication of ma-
terial relating to celebrity figures with high public profiles…There are few re-
cent cases addressing intrusions on privacy by the state, but .. it is perhaps in-
trusion by the state with which the draftsmen of the Convention would have 
been particularly concerned in 1949 and I felt throughout the case the im-
                                                
123  Koops, supra n 42. 
124 Ibid at  656. 
125 (2000) 8 BHRC. 449 . 
126 Wood v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2008] EWHC 1105 (Admin) paras 34 and 43, 
citing Campbell , Murray and von Hannover. 
127 [2008] EWHC 1105 (Admin). 
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portance that the courts should attach to vigilance in this area, while recog-
nising the difficulties of police forces in democratic societies in protecting us 
all from criminal behaviour.” 
 
Interestingly the judge went on to recall the activities of the Staatssicherheitsdienst 
("Stasi") in the former German Democratic Republic who were renowned for employ-
ing thousands of informers as well as conducting near universal surveillance as far as 
was possible in a pre-digital world128. He continued: 
 
“One would hope, for example, that such extreme intrusions would be pro-
tected under the ECHR…The allegedly intrusive activity here is, of course, at 
a far lower level than that, but, in my judgment, it is the development of such 
state activity against which one has to be vigilant.” (paras 27-28) 
 
Despite this opening assertion, the judge found no invasion of privacy had occurred. 
Drawing on previous ECtHR cases129, he found the English courts had “adopted a 
very robust approach to questions of interference with rights under Article 8(1) in re-
lation to the taking of photographs in public places... in assisting in the detection of 
crime”. Before art 8 could be engaged, the infringement of privacy had to reach “a 
certain level of seriousness”; secondly there had to be a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy; third, the justifications available to the state in art 8(2) had to be examined.  The 
judge found the plaintiff was a known activist attending a public meeting and thus had 
very little expectation of privacy. Significantly, the images were to be retained, with-
out general disclosure, for very limited purposes, and not as part of a specific dossier 
on the data subject. Accordingly, there was no interference with the claimant's rights 
under art 8(1). Even if there had been, it would have been justified in context as in ac-
cordance with the law and proportionate. 
 
Most recently, and most appositely for this paper, in Application for Judicial Review 
(Northern Ireland)130 a boy aged 14 was caught on CCTV involved in serious rioting 
in Derry. As part of an active police campaign, “Operation Exposure”, his image was 
published and distributed in leaflets put together by the police. He argued his rights 
under art 8 of the ECHR had been violated. The Supreme Court judges found against 
the plaintiff by various routes : either art 8 was not engaged (eg  because rioting was 
not part of protected “private life”) or that it was, but the interference by the police 
was justified.  Part of what backed this up was that the police had followed a “pains-
taking” process and only circulated the boy’s image as a “last resort”131.  
 
The most interesting dicta come from the speech of Lord Kerr, who found that art 8 
was indeed engaged because of the boy’s age and the effect the publication of the 
photographs may have on him. He made it clear however that this finding did not rest 
                                                
128 See discussion comparing Stasi activities to modern ubiquitous surveillance of digital communica-
tions in a post-PRISM world in talk by Judith Rauhofer, Staff Seminar Series Edinburgh, (Edinburgh, 
18 March 2014) ; slides no longer available online. 
129 See X v UK (1973) Decision 5877/72, Friedl v Austria (1995) 21 EHRR 83, PG & JH v UK (2001) 
Appl. 44787/98 and Perry v UK (2004) 39 EHRR 3. 
130 [2015] UKSC 42. 
131 Ibid, para 76-77. 
 Page 23 of 29	
entirely on whether the boy had a “reasonable expectation of privacy” but was de-
pendent on a myriad “contextual” factors132. He also stressed that the fact that the boy 
was suspected of criminal activity did not alone remove any possibility of interfer-
ence under art 8133. However in this case, the advantages to the boy of being diverted 
from criminal activity, as well as the interest of his community in the prevention of 
crime and apprehension of offenders,  outweighed his interest in privacy134. 
 
From the above, we can discern a priori support in the ECHR for reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy in public space, especially when personal data is not only collected 
but further used, eg published, arranged in dossiers for potential future access (see 
further 7.3 below), search and use. However, we can also see that the English courts 
in their interpretations are reluctant to let such expectations escalate to the point 
where a “public domain” of activity is diminished by privacy rights. Furthermore, de-
spite the potential threat of unfettered police invasion of privacy, the courts are ex-
tremely reluctant to confer privacy protection on criminal activity, even where there is 
only suspicion, and will favour police interference where clear procedural steps have 
been taken to recognise privacy interests. (Interestingly, in the Demos 2015 report 
which updates their legal analysis of SOCMINT135, reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy play a much more prominent role than in the 2013 version.) 
 
Below we will argue that support for a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
SOCMINT has been further increased by (i) the arrival of social media as a mass phe-
nomenon , especially among the young, and (ii) the growth and ease of search and 
data mining of unstructured free text data online.  
 
7.  Moving expectations of privacy in public into the social media and onl;ine 
search era 
 
7.1 Reconsidering expectations of SOCMINT  as “public” by  virtue of site terms and 
conditions 
 
boyd, in her seminal book on young people online,  asks challengingly, is everything 
done in public in the new digital world “public”?136 The 2013 Demos report on legal 
protections for SOCMINT  and its update in 2015137, in the main takes this stance as 
read. These reports accept explicitly that a person may have reasonable expectations 
of privacy in SOCMINT data if  (i) he/she thinks it is private, or (ii) if society accepts 
as objectively reasonable that it is private (with reference to changed expectations af-
ter Snowden).  Yet an expectation of privacy in the first case is still taken as signaled 
only where a person has made an “explicit effort or decision.. to ensure that third par-
ties cannot access this information”(pp70-71). Examples given are closing accounts 
to Friends or password protecting them; or placing robot.txt restrictions on search 
bots.138. In relation to (ii), the report asserts, as in 2013, that material is still assumed 
                                                
132 Ibid, paras 56. 62. 
133 Ibid, para 41. 
134 Ibid, paras 79-80. 
135 See n 45 supra. 
136 boyd, supra n 96 at 203. 
137 See n 45 supra. 
138 Significantly, these ideas are drawn from a US commentators work : Susan Brenner; see Demos 
2015 report at 70. 
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to be “reasonably considered [by society] to be open” in a variety of circumstances, 
but most notably where a user “understand[s] this content is likely to be shared and 
used”  and where there is no indication the “terms of agreement establish that content 
uploaded is private” ; and/or content is made available to third parties via an API (p 
73). 
 
We argue that this is not a valid way to delimit a user’s reasonable expectations of 
privacy in the mass social media age. Even in the simplest case, where the data sub-
ject themselves has knowingly disclosed substantive, personal data about themselves, 
it is simply not credible to argue that accepting standard terms and conditions on a so-
cial media site, typically buried under an obscurely placed hyperlink, negates any 
kind of expectation of privacy. First, as Edwards has noted elsewhere139 , such “con-
sent” to fixed unilaterally imposed terms and conditions is neither free, specific nor 
informed (as DP law requires140) and has become effectively illusory.  Privacy poli-
cies have become too bloated for any normal person to read, as well as being largely 
written in incomprehensible legal language.141 At the same time, privacy controls on 
sites have also become labyrinthine, almost invariably are set to defaults which favour 
disclosure and are changed unilaterally from time to time invariably to disclose more 
types of data to more classes of audience. 142 Finally there is no “marketplace of 
choices” where a user could shop to protect their privacy more adequately; virtually 
all social media sites with any mass audience apply standard term non-negotiable con-
tracts allowing monetization and sharing of user content. While Facebook have made 
efforts, after severe criticism, to improve the presentation of privacy controls – eg by 
allowing users to see what their site looks like to a non-Friend third party – these criti-
cisms are still profound.  
 
In particular, even if these criticisms are rejected, while contract law may be taken 
formalistically to bind the user to terms they do not understand or read in their rela-
tionship with the network, it is hard to see how such terms could operate to remove 
their expectations of privacy as against third parties such as the police.  
 
7.2 Reconsidering expectations of privacy for young people on social media sites 
 
Expectations of privacy are particularly problematic in relation to young adults and 
minors. boyd , in a decade long research programme,  has evolved a convincing the-
ory that teenagers need to socialise and communicate to develop an identity, but that 
historic venues for this – shopping malls,  each other’s houses , etc. – are failing them 
because of the trend towards modern parenting involving intense surveillance and 
control. As  a result teens socialise instead online, but often in public without Friends 
lock protections – why? boyd argues that teens want to socialise with their peers, in-
cluding unknown peers, but do not imagine the other audiences – parents and teach-
ers, let alone the police – who are also invisibly able to watch. Teens therefore choose 
to control the dissemination of their personal data, not by using privacy controls 
                                                
139 Edwards supra n 132. 
140 See art 2,  DPD. 
141 N Bilton, ‘Price of Facebook Privacy? Start Clicking’rNew York Times, (New York, 12 May 2010)   
at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/13/technology/personaltech/13basics.html . 
142  K Opsahl, ‘Facebook's Eroding Privacy Policy: A Timeline’aElectronic Frontier Foundation, (San 
Francisco, 28 April 2010) at  https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/04/facebook-timeline . 
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which are arduous to master and frequently change to defeat their efforts anyway 
(“public by default, private by effort”)143 but by using certain private or shared cryptic 
language or “social steganography”.144 boyd summarises that: 
 
“the dynamics of mediated social situations – including invisible audiences, col-
lapsed contexts and persistent content – further complicate things, making it in-
credibly difficult for teens  to imagine the boundaries of these mediated social sit-
uations” 145 
 
Yet the results of these practices can be disastrous for teens and young adults.  Many 
social media sites by default retain communications as a persistent and searchable ar-
chive. When police get involved, posts or comments may be wrenched from their con-
text and fed into data-mined profiles, leading to mangled meaning and harmful and 
unexpected consequences. For example, a post on a games or hacker site which refers 
to “rape” may mean something quite different from the usual sexual offence use of 
the word146. Nissenbaum has argued powerfully that privacy expectations are contex-
tual: we willingly disclose information in certain contexts (eg to our doctor or our 
friend) which we would not if others were listening (advertisers, parents, the po-
lice).147  On social media sites, such contextual confusions might have lastingly seri-
ous effects for users and their police records and profiles. 
 
7.3 Reconsidering expectations of privacy in unstructured vs structured data  
 
The third crucial point that needs reconsidered in the SOCMINT age is the distinction 
between structured and unstructured data. We noted above the influence of the dictum 
from Rotaru , that mere sporadic monitoring of a data subject may not infringe art 8 
rights of privacy, but systematic collection, use and storage of data about him quite 
possibly will.  This notion was reinforced in Segerstedt-Wiberg v Sweden,148 a case 
involving files kept by the Swedish security police on the applicant drawn from public 
sources such as newspapers and open meetings, where the ECtHR held: 
 
“the information about the applicants that was stored on the Security Police 
register and was released to them clearly constituted data pertaining to their 
“private life”. Indeed, this embraces even those parts of the information that 
were public, since the information had been systematically collected and 
stored in files held by the authorities.149” 
 
Historically, then, what has separated police-state-like ubiquitous surveillance from  
legitimate police observation has been the compiling and keeping of systematic dossi-
ers. In Wood above, the judge referred to the fear of Stasi-style surveillance and this 
                                                
143  boyd supra n 96 at 61-65. 
144 A Marwick “The Public Domain: Social Surveillance in Everyday Life” (2012) 9 Surveillance and 
Society 378. 
145 boyd supra n 96 at 61. 
146 C Miller, “This is your Brain Online: How Twitter Changed The Word “Rape” Politics.co.uk ,  20 
January 2014  at http://www.politics.co.uk/comment-analysis/2014/01/20/this-is-your-brain-online-
how-twitter-changed-the-word-rape.  
147 H Nissenbaum ‘Privacy as Contextual Integrity” (2004) 79 Washington Law Review 119-158. 
148(2007) 44 EHRR 2. 
149 (2007) 44 EHRR 2  Para 71. Note that the ECtHR also found that in some cases covert surveillance 
of political dissidence might also infer a breach of art 10 (freedom of expression). 
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threat is clearly lurking behind the debate in Rotaru, Segerstedt-Wilburg and other 
cases. Drawing on Segerstedt-Wilburg , it seems to be argued that publicly available 
SOCMINT, even if it concerns “private life”, still can be observed and collected so 
long as it is not turned into a detailed dossier on a particular data subject. 
 
In computer science language, as opposed to Strasbourg jurisprudence, what is being 
posited here is a fundamental difference in terms of privacy-invasive potential be-
tween structured and unstructured data. Structured data can be queried and data 
mined; once, unstructured data could not. But with the arrival of the Internet, auto-
mated processing and search algorithms , this distinction has now collapsed. With 
Google (or similar engine), anyone can construct a dossier instantly of a named per-
son from unstructured materials created across decades. The police can do more still, 
using analytical profiling tools dedicated to creating predictive models of what people 
might do or say. There is no need for a Stasi to painstakingly assemble dossiers on 
everyone in their country in case at some point that person becomes of interest. Now 
search and data mining tools make the whole of the unrestricted Internet a dossier 
waiting to happen, at minimum effort and cost, and in very little time. 
 
The European Court of Justice has recently eloquently recognised the impact of auto-
mated search on privacy rights in Google Spain (the “right to be forgotten” case).	
They observed: 	 “It must be pointed out at the outset that… processing of personal data.. carried 
out by the operator of a search engine is liable to affect significantly the funda-
mental rights to privacy and to the protection of personal data when the search by 
means of that engine is carried out on the basis of an individual’s name, since that 
processing enables any internet user to obtain through the list of results a struc-
tured overview of the information relating to that individual that can be found on 
the internet — information which potentially concerns a vast number of aspects 
of his private life and which, without the search engine, could not have been in-
terconnected or could have been only with great difficulty — and thereby to es-
tablish a more or less detailed profile of him. Furthermore, the effect of the inter-
ference with those rights of the data subject is heightened on account of the im-
portant role played by the internet and search engines in modern society, which 
render the information contained in such a list of results ubiquitous”150. 
 
From this perspective, SOCMINT can be seen as the ultimate loophole to avoid the 
ECtHR constraints on systematic collection of dossiers as engaging art 8. 
 
9. Conclusions 
 
                                                
150 Google Spain v Costeja Gonzales, ECJ, Case C‑131/12, para 80. The ECJ may not in general have 
jurisdiction over nation state police surveillance as a matter currently excluded from (most of) EC data 
protection law. However their views on nature of modern online surveillance are certainly relevant. See 
also Schrems v DPC of Ireland CJEU Judgment in case C-362/14 para 94. While the Schrems case is 
not strictly relevant to discussion of open SOCMINT , since it concerns interception of “closed” con-
tent by extra EU authorities, para 94  is interesting contextual evidence of the unhappiness of the CJEU 
with general state access to unstructured content in electronic communications. 
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In January 2015, in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris, David Cameron 
argued, in a widely reported speech, that in the interests of the “war against terror”, 
effective encryption of public communications should be banned: 
 
“In extremis, it has been possible to read someone’s letter, to listen to someone’s 
call, to listen in on mobile communications.. The question remains: are we going 
to allow a means of communications where it simply is not possible to do that? 
My answer to that question is: no, we must not.151” 
 
In such a climate – which has since only got worse not better, given apparently insu-
perable political problems in the Arab world and elsewhere – it is a hard time for aca-
demics to argue for more privacy protection against police surveillance, not less, and 
make any inroads. This has been the story in the UK to date of the persistent criti-
cisms of RIPA, of the failed Communications Data Bill and of the new IP Bill rising 
from its ashes. It is doubly hard to so argue when we are talking about open posts on 
social media which many people intuitively think of as without  legal significance and 
which the police assert make their investigations immeasurably easier152. Yet this  
may turn out to be as important a debate as the one still raging over interception of 
closed communications by security agencies.  
 
Our lives are written out in full and glorious (if sometimes misleading) technicolour 
detail in those millions of tweets, Facebook posts, and YouTube videoes we post 
every day. To say that we implicitly give up all expectations of privacy when we join 
a platform used by millions because of terms and conditions we have not read, did not 
understand and could not alter seems surreal. To say that only those aware enough of 
modern methods of data mining and intelligence-lead policing, and techno-literate 
enough to know how to protect themselves, should be entitled to retain a shred of pri-
vate life while remaining in public discourse, seems a statement of despair.  To say 
that the young cannot find and create their own identity online while young without 
storing up problems and police surveillance later is culpable. 
 
Taking all the points above together, we ask:  are we writing a blank cheque for mass, 
automated, Panoptic surveillance via social media by regarding the collection of open 
SOCMINT as untroublesome to privacy rights?  In the 1950s, the Stasi used a staff of 
c 100,000 secret policemen plus the help of around 500,000 informants to help sur-
veille a population of 16-19 million people in the GDR – a ratio of c. 35 observed per 
each Stasi agent.153 Nowadays, the 17-strong staff154 at the Metropolitan Police Open 
Source Intelligence Unit can conceivably surveille with greater ease the 8 million 
strong population of Greater London – a ratio of 470,588 observed to 1 policeman.  
 
                                                
151 See “How has David Cameron caused a storm over encryption?”, Guardian, 15 January 2015 at 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jan/15/david-cameron-encryption-anti-terror-laws . 
Rules about encryption , somewhat watered down after public furore, have duely appeared in the new 
IP Bill. 
152 Of a sample of US police surveyed in February 2014, 73% believed social media helped solve 
crimes faster, See Social Media use in Law Enforcement, LexisNexis, November 2014 at 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/risk/downloads/whitepaper/2014-social-media-use-in-law-enforcement.pdf. 
153 Figures from Rauhofer supra n 128. 
154 From Wright supra  n 71. 
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What realistic hopes are there for a shift in legal thinking that would take account of 
the threat to privacy inherent in largescale acquisition of open social media content?  
We are not talking here of a ban on acquisition of open SOCMINT; merely for a 
recognition that this is a category of data whose collection must be properly and ap-
propriately authorized under investigatory powers law. There is no sign of this way of 
thinking in the new IP Bill. It is possible however that the courts, probably not of the 
UK but more likely of Strasbourg  or Brussels155, may lead the way in imposing pri-
vacy protection on domestic law. The ECJ already seem to have taken it upon them-
selves in the post-Snowden era to show their teeth and create a stronger sense of pri-
vacy and the rule of law in the open public spaces of the Internet.  We have already 
mentioned the political significance of the Google Spain case, Schrems and Digital 
Rights Ireland cases in this space.  
 
Fundamentally, police surveillance of personal data on social media is part of a wider 
debate about who has the right to appropriate and profit from the digital footprints we 
now leave in the public corridors of the Internet, and what legal and ethical safeguards 
should protect us, the users, given the now near impossibility of abstaining from the 
virtual world.  Whether we are talking about our Facebook posts and Likes being har-
vested to build advertising profiles, our tweets being combed by the well-meaning to 
determine if we are suicidal156, our mobile calls and photos in the Cloud being read by 
the NSA to find out if we are part of a terrorist cell, or our social media posts being 
mined by local police to see if  we are involved in anything from littering to jihadist 
propaganda, in the end the question is the same: do we have any rights of  control 
over our personal data in public?   
 
Furthermore the debate is moving from being merely about collection of our data as 
we  communicate “online” to our whole lives in non-digital contexts – ie, in the real 
world. Increasingly, our movements are tracked by sensors in the smart cards we use 
to access transport and make payments, by our footfall on smart roads and by Inter-
net-connected cars or “autonomous vehicle” we use to get from A to B. Our bodies 
themselves may be tracked eg if we wear fitness monitors or have implanted medical 
devices such as heart pacemakers which communicate data even after surgery. This 
data collected by the “Internet of Things” may be collected in private, typically pri-
vate environments – eg our energy consumption in our home equipped with smart me-
ters – but will also just as likely be collected in public as a kind of “data discharge” in 
smart cities, transport systems and shopping malls. Will this data be seen as naturally 
“public” and therefore lacking reasonable expectations of privacy, as has been the 
case with open SOCMINT? This kind of future , while beyond the scope of this al-
ready long paper157, is one of the reasons why the authors believe this to be a crucial 
topic. If we have no privacy in data disclosed in public in future, we may have no pri-
vacy at all. 
 
                                                
155 Assuming the UK remains in both the EU and the ECHR of course.  
156 See the recent Samaritans radar affair, Kirsty Marrins “Samaritans Radar: 'Charity deserves round 
of applause for putting mission front and centre' The Guardian (London 3 November 2014) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/voluntary-sector-network/2014/nov/03/samaritans-radar-twitter-mission-
charity>. See also Jon Baines ‘ICO: Samaritans Radar Failed to Comply with Data Protection Act’ In-
formation Rights and Wrongs (25 April 2015) at http://informationrightsand-
wrongs.com/2015/04/25/ico-samaritans-radar-failed-to-comply-with-data-protection-act/ . 
157 See further L Edwards “Privacy, security and data protection in smart cities: a critical EU law per-
spective”, forthcoming 2016  European Journal of Data Protection. 
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